Abstract
1 2 3 4 . The primary concern has been with the construction of modeled thought experiments (or imaginary worlds) to support claims for comparative costeffectiveness. Rather than the development of models to generate testable claims or predictions for the anticipated impact of new products and devices in health care systems, the modeled claims are seen as an end in themselves. Unfortunately, readers are not advised, as a matter of course, that non-evaluable cost-effectiveness claims should not be taken at face value.
If a modeled claim is impossible to assess or if the model fails to generate testable claims, then the model fails to meet the standards of normal science. These standards are absolute and have been recognized since the 17th century. The core elements being: (i) the construction of empirically evaluable coherent theories and (ii) the testing of hypotheses through experimentation or systematic observation.
Empirical testability differentiates science from non-science or pseudoscience. Irrespective of whether or not the authors of a model argue that it is a reasonable reflection of reality, a correspondence that is sufficient and necessarily entails the claims made, the absence of testable claims means that the model should be put to one side. This may involve a reconsideration of the model to assess whether or not it is capable of being recast to generate testable claims. If the model is incapable of generating testable claims then it should be rejected.
In the absence of experimentation or observation, a formulary committee has no idea whether modeled claims are right or even if they are wrong. To an unknown and unknowable extent the claims may be misleading and even potentially harmful. Acceptance of the standards of normal science is in contrast, therefore, to a postmodern or relativist position which holds that if the model intends to reflect reality then, given the consensus view within the profession, we should accept the claims made and to factor them, even though they are impossible to evaluate, into formulary decisions.
While a debate over philosophical positions may seem something of a stretch when we address issues of costeffectiveness modeling, the acceptability or otherwise of modeled claims is critical to an assessment of the worth of pharmacoeconomic modeling to support value claims. If we conclude that modeled yet untestable claims should be rejected as a basis for decision making, then we face the prospect of rejecting much of the modeling endeavors over the past 25 to 30 years as well as guidelines for good practice and recommendations for formulary submissions. If we accept the relativist position that modeled claims, even if untestable, are still credible as thought experiments or imaginary worlds then we run the risk of losing status as a 'science' in our rejection of the standards of normal science that underpin our belief in the discovery of new facts.
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The purpose of this review is to evaluate the costeffectiveness or economic evaluation studies that have been published in PharmacoEconomics in the period January 2015 to December 2016. This evaluation is part of an ongoing program at the College of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota exploring the credibility of cost-effectiveness claims; to see whether published claims meet the standards for falsification and replication that are the core of the scientific method.
Methods
A systematic review, following the PRISMA-P checklist (MeSH terms 'cost', 'cost-effectiveness', 'QALY'), of all papers published in PharmacoEconomics in the period January 2015 to December 2016 identified 31 economic evaluation studies 5 . These comprised 14 original research articles, 8 systematic reviews and 9 reviews. These studies are detailed in Table 1 .
In order to judge whether the modeled claims presented or reviewed met the standards of normal science, four questions were considered:
• Is the model capable of generating testable claims?
• Did the author(s) attempt to generate testable claims? • Did the author(s) suggest how the claims might be evaluated? • Did the author(s) caution readers as to the implications of generating non-testable claims?
A testable claim was defined as one that could be evaluated either experimentally or observationally in a timeframe relevant to the needs of a formulary committee (ideally a period of 2 to 3 years). This period was chosen because a testable claim was seen as provisional; a condition established in the WellPoint formulary guidelines issued almost a decade ago. 6 7 . A product or device could, in this context, be accepted by a formulary committee for provisional listing, but subject to an agreement with the manufacturer to report back to the committee with evidence to support the claims made. These claims could be for product comparative effectiveness, for the impact of the product on resource utilization or some combination of these to support a claim for incremental costeffectiveness. The claim for comparative effectiveness could encompass clinical endpoints as well as those captured as patient reported outcomes.
The important point to note is that the modeled claims were not to be judged on the reasonableness or otherwise of the assumptions of the model; a point made recently by Ellis and Silk in reference to claims in string theory modeling 8 . The fact that the claims could not be tested led to those supporting string theory to argue that the inherent elegance of a model should be sufficient for its acceptance, without need to evaluate any testable claims. Ellis and Silk pointed out that this was unacceptable if the standards of normal science were to hold.
Certainly a cost-effectiveness model would be expected to cover comparator products, or least the key comparators, and to identify the target population for the claims. But this does not mean a model should necessarily conform to recommended standards from organizations such as the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) or to items such as the CHEERS checklist 9 10 11 12 13 . While the CHEERS checklist has been embraced by a number of journals, the point is that neither ISPOR recommended standards for good practice or the CHEERS checklist have endorsed the standards of normal science in accepting the central role of claims assessment. In this review there was no attempt to censor or categorize the studies reviewed by such criteria, although given that PharmacoEconomics subscribes to the CHEERS checklist, it was assumed that these criteria would have been addressed as part of the peer review process.
In judging whether or not a model might support testable claims, even if the possibility was not considered by the authors(s), three characteristics of the model are important. These are (i) the modeling framework, (ii) the choice of primary outcome measure; and (iii) the time frame for the model. A Markov or discreet event simulation model with a lifetime perspective and with discounted cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) claims as the primary endpoints would be one that would be impossible to evaluate. Against this, a simple, trial-based decision model with a timeframe of 12 to 18 months with claims expressed in clinical terms (including PROs) and resource utilization endpoints would, given access to readily available data sources in the US, be open to hypothesis testing and feedback to a formulary committee.
In the case of the systematic reviews and reviews, the focus was on, not the individual papers but on the whether or not the reviewer took into account the issue of whether the models presented in the papers under review were capable of generating testable claims, whether any attempts were made to evaluate claims and whether the authors made any suggestions as to how the claims made might be evaluated by, for example, a formulary committee as part of ongoing disease area and therapeutic reviews. A number of these reviews utilized a checklist to evaluate the 'quality' of the study, such as the CHEERS or the Quality of Health Economics Studies (QHES) checklist 14 . The QHES checklist does not consider either the ability to generate testable claims or proposals for how claims might be evaluated as part of a quality assessment.
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A study may be judged 'high quality' by application of the QHES or CHEERS checklist but still may fail to meet the standards of normal science. It may meet the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) reference case standards, but as a result fail to provide operational content in meeting the standards of normal science 15 . Irrespective of the internal 'mathematical elegance' of the cost-effectiveness model, it would be considered by the standards of normal science to be what is described here as an imaginary world or thought experiment.
Results
Original Research Articles
The primary outcome measure in 13 of the 14 original research articles was incremental cost-per-QALY. Subsidiary endpoints included costs, years of life gained and events avoided (e.g., falls). In a number of the articles discount rates were applied to both costs and outcomes to yield discounted cost-per-QALY claims. The majority of the papers, although not necessarily stating it explicitly, attempted to follow NICE reference case standards or those proposed by ISPOR for good modeling standards in generating estimates of direct medical costs and utilizing a generic QALY measure. None of the models utilized measures of generic QALYS generated directly from the comparative products' RCTs. The only paper that reported cost-per-QALYs from a trial generated these indirectly from the SF-12v2 instrument utilized in the trial 24 .
Other studies mapped utility values from other instruments or captured utilities from studies in 'similar' product scenarios.
With the exception of one paper, all utilized a Markov statetransition model framework. The timeframes for the various state transition models ranged from 5 years to the lifetime of the modeled cohort. Seven of the articles employed a time frame of 30 years or longer (4 the lifetime of the cohort) and 4 articles reported on a 10 year timeframe. In the case of the lifetime models, three of these focused on either older patients (with limited lifespans) or those whose health states were in the end stage of the disease. The youngest lifetime cohort at age 40 years was modeled for dermatomysotis, with 56 years for hyperphosphataemia, 70 years for atrial fibrillation and 84 years for injury prevention.
In respect of the questions raised for this review, none of the studies presented considered how the claims made might be evaluated. None of the studies presented testable claims. There were no discussions of how these modeled claims might be factored into formulary decisions. Discussions on the limitations of the studies focused on the deficiencies in the evidence base used to populate the model parameters, the presence of significant evidence gaps, the lack of direct generic QALY measures for the target populations, the difficulty of translating costs estimates across health systems and the degree of uncertainty attached to the modeled claims for comparative effectiveness.
Systematic Reviews
Five of the 8 systematic reviews utilized a quality assessment checklist to grade the individual studies: 3 papers used the CHEERS checklist while 3 utilized the QHES checklist. Zhang et al concluded that of the 53 studies evaluated in psoriasis the majority were of low quality. In their view high quality studies should apply a reasonably long time horizon (with 30% adopting a time horizon of < 1 year), adopt a valid and comparable effectiveness measure (QALY), consider all relevant cost items and conduct a sensitivity analysis 31 . The question of whether or not the model should be capable of generating testable hypotheses was not considered. Hiligsman et al in their review of postmenopausal osteoporosis drugs also reported on an insufficient quality of reporting for several articles 30 . These included methods for identifying and synthesizing clinical effectiveness data, the description of the population and methods used to value preference based outcomes (all but one of the studies used QALYs as the outcome measure) and all analytic methods supporting the evaluation. Again, the question of whether or not the model should be capable of generating testable hypotheses was not considered. None of the reviews raised any questions as to the appropriateness of Markov models in generating testable predictions and the implications for evaluating model findings where, for example, the timelines of the models (9 out of 20 Markov simulations modeled claims for 40 years or more).
The most frequently cited outcomes were QALYs and life years gained (LYG .
The accepted models can extend, in the case of chronic disease, for the lifetime of the patient cohort. Commonly applying Markov models or the more mathematically complex discreet event modeling, the analyst presents results in terms of the recommended gold standard outcome measure of lifetime quality adjusted life years saved, claiming benefits from one product over another. The models are justified by their ability to 'reflect reality', a present and future reality of 'what is', in choice of target population characteristics, treatment arms, assumed resource utilization and costs and outcomes defined by constructed quality of life indices. The models rely for their appearance of 'reasonableness' on their foundation in disparate (yet peer reviewed) literature sources and results reported for RCTs. With due account taken in the modeling technique of parameter and outcome uncertainty, the models are presented as evidence for the comparative effectiveness of competing therapies.
Can this practice be justified? Can we make claims for the comparative impact of competing products that might extend decades into the future and expect them to be taken seriously? Could we argue, for example, that the modeled claims 'reflect reality' and that they should be considered as equivalent to modeled claims that generate testable hypotheses which can be evaluated from existing evidence; an appeal to the facts?
The Standards of Normal Science
The fact that the modeled or simulated claim is defended on the grounds that it 'reflects reality' or that it is 'reasonable' in is representation or correspondence to the target treating environment and the anticipated impact of competing products and devices in not, unfortunately, a justification for accepting the model and claims generated as supporting coverage decisions. If a formulary committee is to consider modeled claims as a basis for a coverage decision then the model claims need to meet the standards of normal science:
the claims should be capable of experimental or observational evaluation. If not, the model and the claims should be put to one side as 'not fit for purpose'.
If a model is said to 'reflect reality' the obvious questions are 'what is reality' and what is a 'reflection'? From the perspective of the model builder (or collaborative group of model builders), the reality they perceive is presumably the state of things that they think actually exists and are 'expected' to exist over the time frame of the model (an imaginary future); their belief in the simulation's correspondence with the real world. If the correspondence is sufficient, then the outcomes claimed are necessarily entailed.
Unfortunately, no two groups may share the same vision of correspondence with the real world. The NICE Evidence Review Group (ERG) may not agree with the manufacturer's submission. Their different realities may generate different models which, while subscribing to the same set of standards, may result in quite different non-testable claims for the superiority of the same competing products. This presents a quandary to a formulary committee where competing models jostle for attention. Whose claims should be accepted? Should the formulary committee attempt to set 'acceptable' modeling parameters, as in the NICE reference case, in order to ring-fence modeling options? Even so, there is still the possibility that different groups will propose different models. Indeed, manufacturers may support competing models that meet common standards. Both are justified on the grounds that they 'reflect reality'. Both are defended on the grounds that they meet the required standards of the commonly held belief system.
Feedback, Information, Evidence
As noted above, neither the CHEERS nor the QHES checklists address the question of whether or not the studies evaluated are capable of generating testable predictions. There is no concept of how, through evaluating claims, new facts might be uncovered. There is also no concept of how claims evaluation may generate feedback to formulary committees and other health decision makers. The view seems to be that this approach is too difficult, time consuming and of little interest to decision makers; building imaginary worlds which have little if any chance of creating testable predictions is the easy option.
Another argument for 'accepting' modeled claims even if they fail to generate testable hypotheses is that we have limited information. Even though the US is well served in access to health data, ranging from administrative claims, possibly linked to laboratory data, together with electronic medical records from in-patient and ambulatory environments, the rest of the world is less well served. Our ability to assess claims for competing products and devices, particularly if we wish to capture patient reported outcomes as a primary endpoint, means that we may either to invest significant resources in data capture in targeted treatment settings or we have to rely on a less resource intensive approach to supporting claims. As a result, it could be argued, we fall back to a 'needs must' justification with our belief in comparative modeled claims driving our research agenda and formulary decisions.
The NICE reference case is clearly not designed to generate empirically evaluable claims. It rejects the standards of normal science. Rather, subject to the ministrations of contracted academic assessment centers, manufacturer's submissions are scrutinized; models are tinkered with, adjustments are made to cost-per-QALY claims and thresholds re-calibrated. This sets the stage for pricing negotiations and agreement on the terms for formulary listing -all driven by an imaginary construct which, in most cases, is a reformulation of an earlier imaginary construct.
NICE arrives at a determination on the acceptability of a product, couched in terms of threshold cost-per-QALY performance. As these claims for threshold performance are impossible to validate, there is little chance that the NICE decision can be effectively challenged (other than though public opinion and the redoubtable 'Daily Mail'). Paradoxically, while there is presumably evidence to justify building the imaginary reference case, there is no appeal to evidence to validate claims made. Indeed, the reference case itself ensures, whether intentional or not, that the evidence is most unlikely ever to eventuate to question NICE decisions. This is seen in what Popper refers to as the problem of demarcation given the possibility, which distinguishes empirical science from pseudoscience, of immunizing any theory against criticism 51 .
What this process overlooks is the fact, as noted by Popper, that never in science are inferences drawn from mere observational experience to the prediction of future events 51 . There is no sense, in these single technology appraisals of any interest in (or any commitment to) a program to discover new facts.
Equivalent Belief Systems
There is, however, a school of thought that could, its adherents would argue, defend the role of imaginary worlds in decision making: relativism. A relativist subscribes to what is known as the equivalence postulate. This postulate holds that it is illegitimate to maintain that one belief system is superior to another. We cannot argue for 'superiority' because we have 'good evidence' for it; in other words, because we have validated a belief or claim by an appeal to the evidence. Application of the standards of normal science is not, for a . If there is a group that can convince others of their standards, then they have the power to create belief and decide what they would label 'knowledge'. The result is that modeled claims are not subject to the scrutiny that comes from generating and testing claims. Hypothesis testing is put to one side. The simulated or modeled claim is the end product.
If the objective is to 'construct truth' in the choice of model and its assumptions, then many of the models reviewed here rest on somewhat shaky empirical foundations. Study limitations detailed by authors include: limited clinical data, lack of clinical follow-up data, inappropriate clinical comparator data, lack of data on-follow up or secondary therapy choices, lack of data to support modeling state transition probabilities, limited direct medical cost data (particularly for second-line therapy), lack of indirect cost data, lack of non-clinical primary endpoint data (e.g., utility scores), reliance on underpowered secondary endpoints from clinical studies and an absence of therapy adherence data. Many of these limitations are self-inflicted, due to the longterm perspective of the model itself and the acceptance that the gold standard endpoint is the QALY.
PharmacoEconomics reports that over the past 30 years it has published over 3,000 papers. If the proportion of nonevaluable modeled claims published in the last 12 months are indicative of the weight given to those publications, then the journal has probably published over one thousand thought experiments to support claims for comparative effectiveness (not to mention publication of systematic reviews which bring in dozens more papers). If this is the case (and given the time span involved) a reasonable question might be to ask if any author has attempted to revisit modeled claims to evaluate whether those claims have been substantiated? After all, if the journal has been prepared to publish, say, a modeled costper-QALY claim for competing products over a 10 year timeframe, then it should have been possible in this timeframe to revisit this claim.
Acceptance of a belief system, of standards for establishing the superiority of comparative product claims that lies outside of the standards accepted for normal science, assumes that those making formulary decisions share that belief system. While this may be true in the UK where NICE and academic research groups have embraced the reference case model (and indeed these groups were party to its development), in a country such as the US there is little evidence for formulary committees or other health decision makers agreeing on the decision criteria for formulary listing. Given the literally thousands of formulary committees that have emerged following the passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, it is most unlikely that any more than a minority are aware (or, at least adhere to) standards proposed by ISPOR and the format for formulary submissions recommended by the AMCP. It is even more unlikely that there are many that would subscribe to the reference case model. They would probably consider it rather odd to base decisions for product value on lifetime cost-per-QALY models, let alone base decisions on conformity of a claim that is patently non-evaluable to a notional threshold value.
The risk, therefore, is that a wider audience, the audience that comprises decision makers for pharmaceutical products, fails to share the decision standards for modeled claims. The effort put into modeling, systematic reviews and organizational frameworks may be seen, at best, to be odd, but irrelevant to ongoing formulary decisions which seek evidence-based value claims and feedback from prior claims for product performance.
Rejecting Equivalence
It is not possible to subscribe to competing belief systems. This is an impossible and indefensible position: either subscribe to the recognized standards of normal science or admit to participating in a pseudoscience. In other words, a metaphysical exercise which is intended to persuade rather than establish new facts; a belief system, from the relativist perspective, which has no claim to superiority over other belief systems. The reason for this is quite obvious: if a claim is not amenable to empirical testing then we don't know whether it is right or whether it is wrong. It may, to an unknown and unknowable extent, be misleading. As such, untestable claims should be relegated to the status of imaginary worlds or thought experiments; a relegation that is effectively summarized in the motto of the Royal Society (1660 first meeting; 1662 Royal Charter): nullius in verba ('take no man's word for it').
The task of relegating economic evaluations to the category of imaginary worlds can be resolved once we abandon attempts to apply standards for modeled claims that are inconsistent with the standards of normal science. Since the 17 th century, standards to be applied to modeled claims have been clearcut: a model is judged on the basis of the hypotheses or claims it creates; its ability to generate new facts. The first hurdle is to agree that the claims are testable, either through observation (e.g., an appeal to existing evidence) or through experiment (e.g. an RCT). The second hurdle is to test the claim. If the claim is not falsified then it receives provisional acceptance. All claims are provisional; subject to further evaluations which may overturn them. This process of 'conjecture and refutation', as described by Popper, is at the core of the scientific method 55 . It supports the notion of progress in science. It is a process that explores our understanding of the real world and sets the stage for generating, testing and the discovery (and exploration) of new facts.
Conclusions
Rejecting or recasting modeled claims that are 'not fit for purpose' is a necessary step, not only for the formulary committee but for other health care decision makers to recognize the importance of a firm and defensible evidence base for decision making. We can still, of course, subscribe to a hierarchy of evidence and work with decision makers to identify and, hopefully, close evidence gaps. In recognizing that modeled claims may not be fit for purpose does, however, raise the issue of whether or not the publication of modeled claims which are essentially imaginary worlds or thought experiments should be encouraged? Could we argue that they are suggestive of more tractable hypotheses, of projections, and should be published even if there is no assessable hypothesis presented? In the last resort it is presumably up to journal editors and staff to agree on whether or not they wish to subscribe to standards which are relativistic or culturally determined. Should they support postmodernist standards which are clearly at variance with those of normal science in publishing claims for comparative product performance? Or should they come out and declare support for clinical and cost-effectiveness models that drive a research agenda that meets the standards of normal science?
The position taken here is unambiguous: if claims based on imaginary worlds or thought experiments are published, the readership should be advised of this by the authors of the paper. This is not to deny the right to publication but merely to ensure that the evidence presented is 'fit for purpose'. If the editorial policy of a journal such as PharmacoEconomics is to subscribe to and support the beliefs accepted in a discipline such as pharmacoeconomics, then this should be made explicit, pointing out that these are not the standards of normal science. The review identified 39 articles that met inclusion criteria from 42 articles were that assessed using full text. Quality assessment followed the CHEERS checklist. All but one of the studies used QALYs as the outcome with model based cost-effectiveness analyses. A Markov cohort model was used in 28 studies with 8 studies using a microsimulation model and one using a discreet-event simulation model. Seven studies used a fixed time horizon (3, 5 or 10
The review did not address the issues of testable claims, the possibility of evaluating any claims or how the claims might be evaluated by a formulary committee. Application of the CHEERS instrument years) with 32 studies using a lifetime perspective. Active osteoporotic drugs were generally cost-effective when compared to no treatment at commonly accepted thresholds of around €45,000 per QALY gained. It was not possible to make recommendations, given heterogeneity of studies, on relative cost-effectiveness of drugs.
effectively precluded these questions being addressed.
Zhang et al 31
Cost-effectiveness of existing treatment options for psoriasis
The review identified 53 articles that met inclusion criteria from 500 articles than merited a full text review. Quality assessment was evaluated by application of the QHES instrument, with the focus on the drivers of cost-effectiveness instead of cost-effectiveness outcomes. Overall, 11 studies used a decision tree framework 10 a Markov model and 7 the York (Woolacott) model i . The authors concluded that most cost-effectiveness analyses were of low quality -determined by short time horizons, not using quality adjusted life years as the effectiveness measure , failure to include all relevant resource units or failing to perform a sensitivity analysis. Dendreon, the manufacturer of sipuleucel-T was asked to submit evidence for clinical and cost-effectiveness the product where the comparator was abiraterone acetate (AA) or best supportive care (BSC). Based on the balance of evidence presented, the ERG concluded that sipuleucel-T in two of three trials improved overall survival but none showed prolonged time to disease progression. The Advisory Committee concluded that the product improved overall survival compared to APC-PBO. However, in the low PSA-subgroup (which was considered the relevant group for marketing authorization) there was no evidence for superiority in overall survival. The company cost-effectiveness model considered both the whole population as well as subgroups. A lifetime horizon was assumed with monthly time cycles with parametric survival curves for overall survival. The primary outcome was QALYs gained. The ERG had a number of concerns with the model and undertook a separate modelling exercise on a set of nine preferred assumptions. The ERGs probabilistic sensitivity analysis suggested either a zero probability or a very low probability of the product meeting a 
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as part of a clinical study. Marketing approval was finally given after a discount was agreed with the manufacturer under the market access scheme. IT was admitted that there were concerns that the appraisal process was initiated before there was sufficient evidence to inform the costeffectiveness assessment.
